Rule 11:  Where We Are and Where We Are Going by Vairo, Georgene M.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 60 Issue 3 Article 3 
1991 
Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going 
Georgene M. Vairo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 475 (1991). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol60/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going 
Cover Page Footnote 
I would like to thank my colleauge, Professor Michael M. Martin, who, as usual, provided me with moral 
support and helpful criticism. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol60/iss3/3 
COMMENTARY
RULE 11: WHERE WE ARE AND WHERE WE ARE GOING
GEORGENE M. VAIRO *
Professor Vairo discusses the compelling need to amend Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure I1. She demonstrates that the rule is being used to limit advocacy in
the federal courts; particularly in civil rights; employment discrimination, and
other types of "disfavored" cases; and that it is creating wasteful satellite litiga-
tion. Lastly, she argues that three recent Supreme Court cases indicate that the
Court is unwilling to address the problems caused by Rule 1L Professor Vairo
thus advocates that the Federal Rules' Advisory Committee revise the rule by
adopting the approach of the Bench-Bar Proposal
I. INTRODUCTION
There once was a time when people like J.D. Conley,I John Di-
oguardi,2 Linda Brown,3 or Alan Bakke4 could feel free to seek a remedy
from a federal court without fear of punishment. The claims presented
in these plaintiffs' cases were problematic: J.D. Conley lacked specific
facts to support his claims at the time he brought his suit; John Di-
oguardi's pro se complaint was nearly incomprehensible; Linda Brown
sought to overturn a well-entrenched Supreme Court precedent; and
Alan Bakke pushed a previously unsuccessful theory of reverse
discrimination.5
* Associate Dean and Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law. I
would like to thank my colleague, Professor Michael M. Martin, who, as usual, provided
me with moral support and helpful criticism.
1. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957). In Conley, the district court
dismissed the complaint of black union members, who accused their union of race dis-
crimination, because the complaint failed to allege specific facts. The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that a complaint may not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him
to relief." Id. Conley facilitated the movement to the liberal form of notice pleading. See
also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947) (the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
"restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving").
2. See Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). Dioguardi was a pro se
plaintiff who alleged in an "obviously home drawn" complaint that the Collector of Cus-
toms had converted his property. See id. at 775. The Second Circuit reversed the dis-
missal of the complaint because "however inarticulately they may be stated, the plaintiff
has disclosed his claims .... we do not see how the plaintiff may properly be deprived of
his day in court to show what he obviously so firmly believes." Id. 774-75.
3. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Linda Brown was one of the
plaintiffs in the Brown school desegregation cases which resulted in the overruling of the
"separate but equal doctrine" of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Using the previ-
ously unsuccessful "reverse discrimination" argument, Alan Bakke successfully chal-
lenged the affirmative action plan of the University of California which gave preference to
disadvantaged minority candidates. See id.
5. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. Similarly, William Webster, the At-
torney General of Missouri, felt free to defend a state law against a challenge that the law
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Although the prospects for success in these cases were uncertain, these
individuals and their lawyers knew they would be heard. They under-
stood they might lose because of the novelty of their claims or defenses,
or the lack of clear or specific proof, but they did not have to fear the
immediate threat of sanctions for trying, because they asserted claims in
good faith. Unfortunately, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure may be changing the calculus for litigating these types of cases. Op-
ponents who feel victimized by the kind of claims described now have a
tool to make these litigants think twice before proceeding and sometimes
to make them pay if they proceed and lose. Thus, Rule 11 has become
one of the most controversial topics in the federal courts over the last
eight years.6
Since the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 became effective, seven major
empirical studies have been published, dozens of law review articles have
been written, several books and monographs have been published,
thousands of reported opinions have been filed, and hundreds of bar asso-
ciation journal and legal and mainstream newspaper articles have been
written which explore the reach and impact of Rule 11. The numerous
cases applying amended Rule 11 have resulted in a complex body of ju-
risprudence.' This complexity results from confusion about the purpose
of Rule 11, from inconsistency in the case law, and from uncertainty over
the effect Rule 11 is having on the federal civil litigation process. This
confusion and complexity, in turn, raises two key questions which have
been vigorously debated during the last eight years: 1) whether Rule 11
is being used to limit access to federal courts-the so-called "chilling
effect" problem; and 2) whether Rule 11, as administered, is achieving
the intended effect of streamlining federal litigation at an appropriate
cost.
In July 1990, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules announced a
Call for Comments about Rule 11.9 The vast majority of the Comments
violated the Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Webster v.
Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
6. See Cochran, Rule M: The Road to Amendment, 61 Miss. L.J. 5, 6-8 (1991)
[hereinafter Road to Amendment]; Solovy & Kaster, Rule 11: Framework for Debate, 61
Miss. L.J. 1, 1 (1991) [hereinafter Framework for Debate]. See generally G. Vairo, Rule
11 Sanctions: Case Law Perspectives and Preventive Measures § 1.01, at 3-4 (Supp.
1991) [hereinafter Case Law Perspectives] (Appendix F lists law review articles criticiz-
ing and applauding Rule 11).
7. See, e.g., Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, § 1.01, at 3-4 (contains complete
discussion of the case law under Rule 11); G. Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of
Litigation Abuse §§ 25-28 (1989) [hereinafter Litigation Abuse] (discusses other federal
sanctions tools, including the court's inherent power, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988), and the
rules governing discovery abuse).
8. I have written an eight hundred page treatise detailing the rule. See Case Law
Perspectives, supra note 6. Greg Joseph has written a treatise on federal sanctioning
power that devotes well over three hundred pages to Rule 11. See Litigation Abuse,
supra note 7.
9. Committee on Rules of Prac. and Proc. of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Call for
Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules
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received by the Advisory Committee were negative,10 and, by design,
most of the persons invited to testify about Rule 11 were critics of the
rule." After the hearing, the Advisory Committee prepared an Interim
Report stating that specific amendments to Rule 11 were necessary and
that certain criticisms of the rule needed to be addressed. 2 The Advi-
sory Committee then drafted an amended version of Rule 11 ("Proposed
Draft"), which was reviewed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure in July 1991.11 In addition, a counter-proposal-the Bench-
Bar Proposal put forth by a number of federal judges, distinguished at-
torneys, and leading commentators on Rule 11-has been circulated for
comment. 14
This Commentary presents an empirical framework for analyzing the
critical issues raised by Rule 11: whether the rule is creating too much
satellite litigation and whether it is being used disproportionately against
certain types of plaintiffs. It then discusses three recent Supreme Court
cases to demonstrate that the federal courts cannot, and the Supreme
Court will not, meaningfully address the two critical problems Rule 11
has generated.' 5 Finally, it analyzes the Advisory Committee's Proposed
Draft of Rule 11 and the Bench-Bar Proposal and concludes that the
latter provides a more effective cure to the most egregious problems cre-
ated by the rule.
(Aug. 1990), reprinted in 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Written
Comments].
10. I was one of 16 persons invited to testify at the public hearing. Accordingly, I
received all the written responses to the Call for Comments and analyzed them. Over 100
groups and individuals responded. No more than 10% of the comments could be con-
strued as indicating satisfaction with the current version of Rule 11.
11. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
12. Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, Interim Report on Rule 11 (1991), reprinted in
Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, at 1-2 app. I [hereinafter Interim Report].
13. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 Proposed Amendment, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 74 (1991)
(proposed on June 13, 1991) [hereinafter Proposed Draft]. The draft has been distributed
to the bench and bar for comments. The Advisory Committee will receive comments
until February 15, 1992 and will hold a hearing on the proposed amendments in Los
Angeles on November 21, 1991. See Letter from Hon. Robert E. Keeton to The Bench
and Bar, Aug. 15, 1991, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 56 (1991). It is not anticipated that any
amendments will be approved by the Standing Committee on Civil Rules until the sum-
mer of 1992 at the earliest. Under the Rules Enabling Act, the Supreme Court must
transmit to Congress amendments proposed by the Standing Committee that it has ap-
proved by May 1 of the year in which the proposed rule would become effective. See 28
U.S.C. § 2074 (1988). The rule becomes effective on December I of that year, unless
Congress takes action before that date. Thus, the earliest an amended rule could become
effective is December 1, 1993.
14. See Higginbotham, J., et aL, Bench-Bar Proposal to Revise Civil Procedure Rule
11, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 159 (1991) [hereinafter Bench-Bar Proposal].
15. For an analysis of all aspects of Rule 11 and extensive citations to cases discussing
the various issues that have arisen since the rule was amended, see Case Law Perspec-
tives, supra note 6, passim.
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II. CONFESSIONS OF AN INADVERTENT EMPIRICIST
Rule 11 has become a number-cruncher's paradise,16 and I am perhaps
to blame. In 1985, as the controversy about Rule 11 began to unfold, I
was contacted by the New York Times for my impressions about the
Rule 11 experience. I responded in rough percentages. The next day I
received a call telling me that my "statistics" were being used in the arti-
cle.' 7 In a state of near-panic, I immediately reviewed the relatively
small pile of all the Rule 11 cases that had been reported to that date to
confirm my rough estimates. These "statistics," which I expanded and
incorporated into an article about Rule 11,1" quickly became ammunition
for critics of Rule 11, because they seem to confirm that Rule 11 is being
used disproportionately against plaintiffs, especially in civil rights, em-
ployment discrimination, and other types of "disfavored" litigation. The
statistics also show that Rule 11 has become a "cottage industry" and is
counterproductively producing more litigation instead of streamlining
current litigation proceedings.
Professor Stephen Burbank, the Reporter for the Third Circuit Task
Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, criticized my survey of
published Rule 11 cases as "highly problematic."19 Although the picture
emerging from any study is admittedly clouded by the methodology of its
author, statistics can provide helpful generalizations. The purpose of my
study was not to paint the definitive picture, but rather to provide the
bench and bar with an overview of the Rule 11 experience and to show
what the courts think is important enough to be reported.20 In any
event, the more carefully planned and "statistically correct" studies con-
ducted since my frantic handcount confirmed my preliminary findings.
Indeed, the key trends reported by the Third Circuit Task Force and the
Federal Judicial Center in 1988 are comparable to those identified by my
study.2'
A. How Confusion About The Primary Purpose of and Proper
Approach to Rule 11 Caused a "Cottage Industry"
Early Rule 11 opinions tended to ignore the stated purpose of Rule 11.
16. See T. Willging, The Rule 11 Sanctioning Process 67-81 (Federal Judicial Center
1988) [hereinafter FJC Study]; American Judicature Soc'y, Rule 11 in Transition: The
Report of the Third Circuit Task Force on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 at 56
(1989) [hereinafter Third Circuit Task Force Report].
17. See Lewin, A Legal Curb Raises Hackles, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1986, § D, at 1, col.
3.
18. See Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 189, 199-203 (1988) [herein-
after A Critical Analysis].
19. Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 56.
20. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 (2d
Cir. 1985) (explicating purpose of amended Rule 11), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 918 (1987).
21. Although my statistics, based on reported cases, are more dramatic, the trends
identified by the other two surveys were remarkably similar. See Third Circuit Task
Force Report, supra note 16, at 56; FJC Study, supra note 16, at 75.
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This is partly explained by the courts' confusion about the primary pur-
pose of Rule 11. The 1983 Advisory Committee suggested that the
amended rule was designed to deter abusive litigation behavior,' while a
Federal Judicial Center Study stated that its purpose was "to punish the
offending party, to compensate the injured party, and to deter ... future
[abusive] conduct.,2 3 Two practical problems resulted. First, the same
Federal Judicial Center study demonstrated that compensation-oriented
judges were more likely to impose sanctions than were those who were
either punishment- or deterrence-oriented.24 Thus, the case results and
reasoning as to whether there was a Rule 11 violation were inconsistent.
Second, courts' views of the purpose of Rule 11 affected their determi-
nations as to the type of sanction that should be imposed. In re
Yagman2 provides a good illustration of the problem. In this case, the
district court imposed a sanction of $250,000 in attorneys' fees at the end
of the trial. The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that the "primary pur-
pose" of Rule 11 is to "deter subsequent abuses" in the same case.26
Finding a Rule 11 violation and imposing a sanction at the end of the
case, without giving the offender notice at the time of the abusive con-
duct, would not achieve the specific deterrent effect articulated by the
court.2 7
If the court had found that the purpose of the rule was compensatory,
a sanction of $250,000 in attorneys' fees would have been appropriate
because the defendant incurred costs of over $290,000. The focus on de-
terrence resulted in a finding that the district court's process was flawed
and that the sanction imposed was therefore improper. Thus, Yagman
demonstrates the need for clear guidance on the specific purpose of Rule
11.
The failure of courts to consistently focus on the deterrent purpose of
the rule when deciding Rule 11 cases, combined with the routine use of
attorneys' fees as the sanction, has had counterproductive results. By
issuing sanctions amounting to attorneys' fees in ninety-six percent2" of
the cases, courts implicitly accept the proposition that Rule I 1 is a provi-
sion designed to provide the financial incentive necessary for attorneys to
challenge their adversaries' questionable claims as being so groundless
that the imposition of sanctions is warranted. Thus, many litigants now
22. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, advisory committee
notes, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198, 199 (1983) [hereinafter ACN].
23. S. Kassin, An Empirical Study of Rule 11 Sanctions (Federal Judicial Center
1985), reprinted in 330 PLI 473, 491 (1987) [hereinafter Empirical Study].
24. See id at 512-13.
25. See generally In re Yagman, 796 F.2d 1165, 1183-84 (9th Cir. 1986) (court found
that sanctions did not further the purpose of Rule 11), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 963 (1987).
26. See id. at 1183-84.
27. See id. But see ACN, supra note 22, at 200-01.
28. Cf Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule ll-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 Geo. L.i. 1313, 1333
(1986) [hereinafter Chilling Problems] (concluding that monetary awards were employed
in 96% of cases in which sanctions were imposed).
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view Rule 11 as a fee-shifting device, which has caused a tremendous
increase in the number of Rule 11 motions. Contrary to the purpose of
Rule 11, a new form of litigation-Rule 11 motion practice-has flooded
the courts and impeded the settlement of cases.
B. The "Cottage Industry:"
The Counterproductive Impact of Rule 11
From 1938, when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted,
to 1983, there were only a handful of reported Rule 11 decisions.29 Dur-
ing the first three and a half years after 1983, when Rule 11 was
amended, 688 Rule 11 decisions were published--496 district court opin-
ions and 192 circuit court opinions. 3° By the end of 1990, over 3,000
cases had been reported.31 Although local legal culture seems to have an
effect on attitudes about making Rule 11 motions, 32 the general success
rate of Rule 11 motions is high enough to explain their vast increase in
use.13 It is this increased use of the rule that counterproductively has
29. See Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking"
Problems With Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 61 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 36-37 (1976) [hereinafter Honesty
in Pleading] (reporting only 19 opinions, and only 3 in which a sanction was imposed).
30. See A Critical Analysis, supra note 18, at 199.
31. See New York State Bar Ass'n, Comments on Rule I1 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 4 (Nov. 1990).
32. For the first few years after Rule 11 was amended almost one-third of the re-
ported cases came from district courts in New York City and Chicago. Although that
percentage declined as Rule 11 took hold throughout the country, Rule 11 is likely to
remain largely an urban phenomenon, where practice is typically more impersonal, with
less good-will among the attorneys. Attorneys in urban districts, therefore, are less reluc-
tant to bring Rule 11 motions.
The Third Circuit Task Force Report similarly concluded that local legal culture re-
garding attitudes towards collegiality may have an effect on sanction incidence. See
Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 62-65. In fact, most of the New
Jersey cases involved New York lawyers. In one New Jersey case, the New Jersey local
counsel "believed that the Rule 11 issue was raised because 'two New York attorneys
were fighting like cats and dogs over discovery disputes.... had [it] been two New Jersey
attorneys, it would not have happened." id. at 63-64.
33. Between August 1, 1983 and December 15, 1987, Rule 11 sanctions were re-
quested 680 times in reported cases. See A CriticalAnalysis, supra note 18, at 199. Viola-
tions were found, or warnings given, in 57.8% of these cases, and the rate of sanctions
increased during the period studied. See id. Surveys indicate, however, that the rate of
sanctions may be substantially lower in the unreported cases. See Nelken, The Impact of
Federal Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern District of California, 74 Judica-
ture 147, 149 (1990) [hereinafter Impact of Rule 11 in Northern California] (noting that
the denial of sanctions motions in unreported cases is far higher than in reported cases).
For example, attorneys responding to a New York State Bar Association survey reported
that sanctions were awarded in 32% of the cases in which they are requested. See New
York State Bar Ass'n, Report of the Committee on Federal Courts: Sanctions and Attor-
neys' Fees, at 2 (June 8, 1987). The Third Circuit Task Force Report noted that sanc-
tions are imposed in only 13.6% of the cases in which they are requested. See Third
Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 57. The Third Circuit, however, is known
as a particularly lenient judge of alleged Rule 11 violations. See id. at 62; see, e.g.,
Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987) (referring to motions under
Rule 11 as bordering on the "abusive" where issues are close). Indeed, Prof. Burbank
suspects that the rate of sanction is higher in other circuits, particularly the Seventh
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created a "cottage industry" oriented against plaintiffs.
1. Is Rule 11 Deterring Meritless Claims?
The Advisory Committee hoped that by making attorneys' certifica-
tion obligations clear, amended Rule 11 would encourage attorneys to
practice more responsibly.34 In the years since, it has become clear that
Rule 11 is having such an impact on lawyers' practice. In a study of the
Northern District of California, for example, Professor Melissa Nelken
found that Rule 11 precipitated a decrease in filings of boilerplate de-
fenses and counterclaims and discouraged "questionable cases."" The
rule also has prompted many law firms to establish policies or guidelines
regarding whether papers may be filed and whether a Rule 11 motion
should be made.36
Despite these encouraging facts, the recent Federal Judicial Center
Preliminary Report ("Preliminary Report") suggests that the problem of
frivolous lawsuits is illusory and that Rule 11 may not be the best deter-
rent for improper filings. Indeed, approximately three-quarters of the
responding judges thought groundless litigation was either only a small
problem or no problem at all.37 Moreover, only a few judges thought
Rule 11 was "very effective" in deterring groundless pleadings.3" These
judges stated that other methods, such as prompt rulings on motions to
dismiss, motions for summary judgment, Rule 16" status conferences,
and warnings, were just as effective or more effective tools for managing
groundless litigation.' Thus, at least one study implies that the frivolous
litigation problem is no problem at all and that Rule 11 may not be the
best cure for whatever ails the system.
2. Rule 1I's Effect on Settlement
Because Rule 11 is designed to streamline litigation, it should have the
effect. of expediting the resolution of lawsuits. Although lawyers sur-
Circuit. See Burbank, American Civil Procedure: The Example ofRule 11, 137 U. Pa. L
Rev. 1925, 1961-62 (1989) [hereinafter American Civil Procedure]. Nonetheless, the rate
is high enough in general to encourage Rule 11 motions.
34. See Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, § 1.03, at 8.
35. Impact of Rule 11 in Northern California, supra note 33, at 149-50.
36. See id. at 150.
37. See E. Wiggins & T. Willging, Rule 11 Judge Survey and Field Study Preliminary
Reports § 4, at 2 (Federal Judicial Center 1991) (available in Fordham Law Review Of-
fice) [hereinafter Preliminary Report]. Ironically, over 80% of judges who responded to
questions from the Federal Judicial Center indicated that they believed Rule I 1 should
be retained in its present form. See itd § 4, at 15. The Federal Judicial Center did not ask
the judges to evaluate specific proposals for amending Rule 11. Rather it asked judges to
chose between the current rule, the pre-1983 version of the rule, or an amended version of
the rule. Only seven percent believed the rule should be returned to its pre-1983 lan-
guage. See it However, 12.5% thought the rule should be amended in some way. See
id.
38. See id. § 4, at 4-5.
39. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.
40. See Preliminary Report, supra note 37, § 4, at 13-14.
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veyed in the Preliminary Report believed that Rule 11 has an impact on
the settlement process, the evidence is unclear as to whether they believe
the overall impact is positive or negative.4 When there is an early find-
ing of a Rule 11 violation, the threat of a sanction in marginal cases may
create a climate that is favorable to settling the action, especially if the
court has a policy of postponing the determination of the appropriate
sanction until the end of the case. The attorney charged with violating
the rule may feel pressured to "settle cheap" in the hopes of having any
sanctions finding overturned. On the other hand, when a litigant believes
the court is not impressed with a novel theory, the litigant may settle too
cheaply, thereby obstructing the positive development of the law.
In contrast to lawyers, most judges surveyed in the Preliminary Report
indicated that Rule 11 has no net effect on settlement.42 Taken together
with their responses that Rule 11 requests exacerbate unnecessarily con-
tentious behavior between opposing parties,43 however one may infer that
the overall impact of Rule 11 on the settlement process is negative. In-
deed, as Rule 11 motions have become more common, cordiality among
attorneys has broken down, thus making it harder for judges to settle
cases.' If Rule 11 discourages settlement, the promised benefits of a
streamlined judicial system will not be achieved.
41. See id.
42. Id. § 4, at 9-10. More than two-thirds of the judges surveyed in the Preliminary
Report believe that Rule 11 either has no impact on the settlement process (37%) or that
the net effect of the rule is even (32%), because the rule promotes settlement as often as it
impedes it. Id. § 4, at 9. Twenty percent of the judges who responded, however, believe
that Rule 11 impedes settlement in more cases than not. Id. Only 11% of those judges
stated that the rule encourages settlement. Id. Interestingly, many judges failed to re-
spond to the question about settlement effects, probably because judges are not always
privy to the settlement practices or negotiations of the parties and they felt they could not
offer a knowledgeable response. To the extent that many judges lack meaningful infor-
mation about the settlement process, their responses may not, in fact, be helpful.
43. Over 50% of the judges surveyed indicated that Rule 11 exacerbates contentious
behavior between opposing parties. Id. Only 7.9% think Rule 11 requests curtail such
behavior, and only 7.9% think Rule 11 requests have no effect on the interactions of
opposing counsel. Id. Almost 42% of the judges believed that Rule 11 had no net effect
on the parties behavior because in some cases it exacerbates poor behavior and in others it
curtails it. See id.; see also FJC Study, supra note 16, at 115-20 (studies reflect concern
that sanctions may be used as bargaining chips in settlement negotiation). But see Third
Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 85-86 (finding little evidence that Rule 11
has poisoned relationships between the bench and bar and only some evidence that the
rule has poisoned relationships among opposing counsel).
44. See, e.g., Hot Locks, Inc. v. Ooh La La, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 751, 752 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (sanctions destroy professional collegiality necessary for prompt and fair settle-
ments); Weinstein, Reflections on the 1983 Amendments to US. Rules of Civil Procedure,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 14, 1983, at 4, col. 1 (sanctions found to be counterproductive because
they can create ill will among attorneys and between the judge and attorneys); Comment,
Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Prescriptions to Ease the Pain?,
15 Tex. Tech L. Rev. 887, 903 (1984) [hereinafter Recent Changes] (sanctioning may
convert atmosphere of cooperation into combativeness).
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C. The Chilling Effects of Rule 11
1. Rule 11 as a Defendant's Tool
Critics feared that Rule 11 would be used to chill access to the federal
courts because the rule would be employed aggressively by defense attor-
neys against litigants like John Dioguardi and Linda Brown.4 5 The re-
ported cases justify those fears and suggest that amended Rule 11 is being
used disproportionately against plaintiffs," particularly in certain types
of litigation such as civil rights, employment discrimination, securities
fraud cases brought by investors, and antitrust cases brought by smaller
companies." In fact, the Federal Judicial Center's 1991 Preliminary Re-
port reveals that the rule is even more pro-defendant than previously
realized.48
This disparate result is hardly surprising, since most Rule 11 cases
involve challenges to pleadings. The Advisory Committee Note to Rule
11 mentions pleadings violations more frequently than other types of vio-
lations and suggests that the most problematic pleading is the com-
plaint.49 The perception seems to be that "the plaintiff started it."
Accordingly, defendants are encouraged to use Rule 11 to weed out and
punish parties who file groundless complaints. In addition, because de-
fendants generally want to increase settlement leverage and benefit more
from delay than plaintiffs, they have a greater incentive to seek Rule 11
45. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
46. Plaintiffs are sanctioned in 59.6% of the cases in which they are the target, while
defendants are sanctioned in 51.4% of the cases in which they are the target. See Third
Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 57. But see FJC Study, supra note 16, at 75
(finding that the rate of imposition of sanctions on defendants (76%) was actually greater
than the rate for plaintiffs (60%, although plaintiffs were still targeted for sanctions more
often)).
47. See A Critical Analysis, supra note 18, at 200-01. "In the 57.8% of the reported
cases in which a Rule 11 violation is found, the plaintiff is the violator in 46.9% of the
cases, while the defendant is the violator in only 10.9% of the cases. This great difference
is explained by the fact that the plaintiff is the target of the sanctions motion in 536 of the
680 reported Rule 11 cases (78.8%)." Id. at 200. The Federal Judicial Center study also
shows that plaintiffs are targets in four times as many cases as defendants are targets. See
FJC Study, supra note 16, at 75 & n. 153. The Third Circuit Task Force Report numbers,
which included reported and unreported cases within the Third Circuit, "are not as strik-
ing as statistics based on published decisions" but tend to confirm the hypothesis of much
more frequent invocation of Rule 11 against plaintiffs than defendants. Third Circuit
Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 65.
48. In the five districts surveyed in the study, the plaintiff-defendant sanction ratio
was 80% to 7%, 77% to 23%, 81% to 9%, 80% to 20%, and 61% to 38%. See Prelimi-
nary Report, supra note 37, § 2, at 19. In the Eastern District of Michigan, the plaintiff 's
side was targeted 72% of the time and the defendant's side 25% of the time. See id. at
17. In the Western District of Texas, the spread was 52% plaintiffs, 44% defendants; in
the District of Arizona, the spread was 55% plaintiffs, 40% defendants; in the District of
Columbia, the spread was 59% plaintiffs, 39% defendants; and finally in the Northern
District of Georgia, the spread was 59% plaintiffs, and 35% defendants. See id.
49. Cf. ACN, supra note 22, at 198-201 (discusses pleadings violations).
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sanctions." The various studies of Rule 11 thus illustrate a serious im-
balance in the rule, favoring defendants at the expense of the plaintiff and
her attorney. The disparate rate of sanction must be eliminated to avoid
the appearance and existence of unfairness to one "side" of the litigation
equation.
2. Disfavored Actions
Many commentators5' object to Rule 11 on the ground that the rule
"chills" vigorous advocacy, especially in "disfavored" lawsuits such as
civil rights and employment discrimination cases and certain kinds of
securities fraud and RICO cases.52 The statistics generated from the re-
ported cases corroborate this view because they show that such cases are
the subject of a disproportionately high number of Rule 11 cases.5"
Plaintiffs are the targets of the sanction request in 86.4% of civil rights
and employment discrimination cases,54 and they are sanctioned at a
much higher rate than plaintiffs in other cases.55
It is difficult to generalize about the significance of these statistics. The
large number of cases in which sanctions are awarded may mean one of
two things: 1) that there are relatively more frivolous civil rights cases,
and that these cases are being justifiably dismissed and the offending par-
ties and attorneys rightfully sanctioned; or 2) that Rule 11 is an unfair
tool for defendants that allows them to unfairly attack civil rights plain-
tiffs. Unfortunately, there is ample statistical evidence that the latter is
50. See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 67-68. This study notes
that the differential impact of Rule 11 on plaintiffs is likely to continue. See id. at 68.
51. There has been an explosion of articles about Rule 11. Most are critical of the
rule. See, e.g., Chilling Problems, supra note 28, at 1338-52 (arguing that Rule 11 has had
a "chilling effect" on the assertion of claims and defenses on the lawyer-client relation-
ship); Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 Harv.
L. Rev. 630 passim (1987) [hereinafter Plausible Pleadings] (arguing that the courts have
applied Rule 11 too broadly, thus causing excessive constraints on pleadings). For a list
of all law review articles written on Rule 11, see Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, at
app. F.
52. Chilling Problems, supra note 28, at 1340-41.
53. See, e.g., FJC Study, supra note 16, at 74 (twenty-five percent of Rule 11 cases
were civil rights cases); id. at 160-62 (civil rights filings were only 7.6% of civil filings
from 1983-1985, but accounted for 22.3% of published Rule 11 decisions). But see Third
Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 69-70 (finding "less reason for concern" at
least in the Third Circuit; requests for sanctions in civil rights cases (18.2%) were only
slightly higher than would be expected on the basis of the percentage of such cases filed
(16%)).
54. See A Critical Analysis, supra note 18, at 200. This statistic includes pro se civil
rights and employment discrimination actions. It does not include tax protest cases. See
id. at 200 n.60.
55. Sanctions are awarded against plaintiffs in 71.5% of the cases in which they are
the target, a figure that is a full 17.3% higher than the average for plaintiffs in all other
cases (54.2%). See A Critical Analysis, supra note 18, at 200-01. Defendants are targeted
in 13.6% of the cases, and sanctioned in 50% of these cases, but this represents only
6.8% of all civil rights and employment discrimination Rule 11 cases. See id. at 201.
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the explanation in far too many cases. 6
The Rule 11 experience in cases involving securities fraud and RICO
violations provides an interesting contrast to both the civil rights area
and Rule 11 cases in general. Although plaintiffs in securities fraud and
RICO cases are the target of sanctions motions at a slightly higher rate
than in civil rights cases, (84.3% of these cases), they are sanctioned in
only 45.5% of the cases." One explanation for the higher target rate of
sanctions motions may be that attorneys in the large firms that typically
defend trade regulation cases have enthusiastically embraced Rule 11 to
deter what are perceived to be strike suits.
An explanation for the disparity in the success rate of sanctions mo-
tions may be that judges are more willing to accept innovative legal theo-
ries advanced by plaintiffs in securities fraud and RICO cases, where
much of the law is unsettled, than in the more developed areas of civil
rights and employment discrimination law." Indeed, most of the sanc-
tions in the civil rights categories are awarded because the plaintiff's
legal theory has been held to be frivolous, 9 while in securities fraud and
RICO cases, the basis for a sanction is more likely to be a failure to
engage in a reasonable inquiry as to the factual basis for the claims.'
56. The Federal Judicial Center attempted to study this question in its survey by
asking lawyers whether they refrained from bringing arguably meritorious cases because
of a concern about sanctions. See FJC Study, supra note 16, at 167. Twenty percent
responded affirmatively. l at 163. Lawyers also indicated that the threat of Rule 11
sanctions had a cautioning effect on their practice. See id at 167. See generally Prelimi-
nary Report, supra note 37 (contains interesting data on the types of civil rights cases and
arguments that were the subject of sanctions).
57. A Critical Analysis, supra note 18, at 201. Securities fraud and RICO cases com-
prise 15.2% of the Rule 11 cases, and antitrust and other trade regulation cases comprise
another 10% of the cases. See id; see also FJC Study, supra note 16, at 74 (RICO cases
constituted 8%, Securities/Commodities cases 5%, and Antitrust cases 5% of the sample
of reported decisions studied).
58. However, the law in civil rights and employment discrimination cases arguably is
just as dynamic as in securities fraud and RICO cases.
59. See Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, § 4.01[b][l][C], at 170-79.
60. See id § 6.05[e], at 473-74. As might be expected from the foregoing discussion,
the complaint leads to the greatest amount of sanctions activity. The Third Circuit Task
Force reported that complaints formed the basis for 50% of the requests for sanctions.
See Third Circuit Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 66.
Another area, but one in which quite an opposite picture emerges, is diversity contract
or other commercial dispute cases. In these cases, which comprise 15.9%, of the Rule II
cases, the plaintiff is the target only 58.3% of the time, and the defendant is the target
41.7% of the time. See A CriticalAnalysis, supra note 18, at 202; see also Third Circuit
Task Force Report, supra note 16, at 108-09 (contracts cases comprised 24.7% of the
cases studied in this report). The most surprising finding, however, is that the defendant
is actually sanctioned at a higher rate than plaintiffs. Plaintiffs are sanctioned in 52.4%
of the cases in which they are the targets, which is lower than the corrected average, and
defendants are sanctioned 55.6% of the time in which they are the targets. See A Critical
Analysis, supra note 18, at 202. Perhaps this is because the relative "strength" of the
parties in terms of the merits of the case and perceived quality of the representation and
advocacy favors the plaintiffs in these cases. In other words, perhaps the perception that
defendants unjustifiably stonewall in these cases makes them the more likely Rule I I
offender. See id
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The statistical picture that has developed since Rule 11 was amended
is an interesting one. The data strongly suggest that Rule I l's impact
has been far greater than the 1983 Advisory Committee predicted. Un-
fortunately, statistical studies do not help develop criteria for determin-
ing whether Rule 11 is worth its costs. The Rule 11 debate implicates the
fundamental tenets of the federal system of civil procedure and asks
whether we can afford notice pleading and a liberal discovery system
which, in the estimation of some, stacks the deck too much in favor of
plaintiffs.6 Thus, the Rule 11 dilemma cannot be resolved until the Ad-
visory Committee meets that issue head-on by examining our whole sys-
tem of rules, rather than trying to use Rule 11 as a quick fix for all the
system's perceived ills.
Indeed, drastic changes in the judicial climate over the last ten years
parallel the issues raised by Rule 11. The most important change is that
the Supreme Court has been guarding the federal courthouse door more
and more zealously through the use of summary judgement and other
doctrines, such as standing and abstention.62 The Court's implementa-
tion of Rule 11 can be viewed as part of this trend to limit access to the
federal courts.
III. THE SUPREME COURT: TAKING RULE 11 LITERALLY
By interpreting Rule 11 literally, three recent Supreme Court cases-
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group,63 Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp.,' and Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communica-
tions Enterprises, Inc. 65-- have ignored the "chilling effect" and "satellite
litigation" problems caused by Rule 11. First, the Court's literal inter-
pretation that focuses on strict deterrence is unforgiving to plaintiffs who
have claims that are at the edge of the law. Second, its literal interpreta-
tion of the rule ironically encourages satellite litigation by allowing par-
ties to litigate Rule 11 sanctions even after the original complaint has
been withdrawn voluntarily by the plaintiff. Lastly, the Court's literal
interpretation permits and even encourages the use of Rule 11 as a fee-
shifting device.
61. See generally Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 433, 492-93 (1986) [hereinafter Revival of Fact Plead-
ing] (notice pleading should be abandoned since it affords broad discovery to abusive
litigants and is merely an expensive waste of time).
62. See Vairo, Making Younger Civil: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference
to State Court Proceedings, 58 Fordham L. Rev. 173, 174-76 (1989) [hereinafter Making
Younger Civil]; Vairo, Through the Prism: Summary Judgment and the Trilogy, in 3
Trial Evidence, Civil Practice, and Effective Litigation Techniques in Federal and State
Courts 1557, 1560 (ALI-ABA 1991) [hereinafter Through the Prism].
63. 110 S. Ct. 456 (1989).
64. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
65. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
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A. Pavelic & LeFlore: May Non-Signers be Sanctioned?
Pavelic & LeFlore instituted the literal interpretation approach to Rule
11.L The question in this case was whether only the attorney signing a
paper which violated Rule 11 could be sanctioned, or whether the signing
attorney's law firm could also be sanctioned. Reasoning that the lan-
guage of the rule permitted only the signer to be sanctioned, the Court
refused to impose liability on the law firm.67 Although the Court agreed
that permitting sanctions against the law firm would "better guarantee
reimbursement of the innocent party," it found that the key purpose of
Rule 11 is deterrence" and that a literal approach to Rule I 1 would have
"greater economic deterrence upon the signing attorney"69 than would a
broad imposition of liability on the law firm.
While the emphasis on the deterrent effect of the rule is worthwhile in
that it could minimize the use of fee-shifting sanctions, it is clear that the
Supreme Court has in mind strict deterrence, rather than amelioration of
the harsher effects of Rule 11. The Court's strict interpretation of Rule
11 thus forebodes even greater problems for those who would raise
claims that are at the edge of the law. If one fies such a claim, but then
is persuaded it is not worth the candle and voluntarily dismisses, one
runs the risk of being sanctioned.70
B. Cooter & Gell: Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
Cooter & Gell signaled an even tougher approach to Rule I 11"' The
Court in this case addressed three issues: 1) whether the district court
had the power to sanction a party who voluntarily dismissed an action;
2) what is the appropriate appellate standard of review in a Rule 11 case;
and 3) whether additional sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees may be
imposed for defending a Rule 11 award on appeal. 72 The Court's an-
swers to the first two questions, which will be discussed below, have the
potential to exacerbate the rule's chilling effect and the current satellite
litigation problems.
1. When Does a Court Have Jurisdiction to Sanction?
A litigant who becomes aware that a particular paper, negligently filed,
66. See Pavelic & LeFlore, 110 S. Ct. at 458. The Court stated that it would "give the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning." Id. at 458.
67. See id. at 458-60.
68. Id. at 460.
69. Id.
70. See, eg., Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1387-88 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (court
imposed sanctions against Title VII plaintiffs and their attorneys involved in large em-
ployment discrimination class action against U.S. Army after they voluntarily withdrew
most claims before trial), aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Blue v. U.S. Dep't of Army, 914
F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1580 (1991).
71. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
72. For discussion of this aspect of Cooter & Gell, see Case Law Perspectives, supra
note 6, § 9.04[b], at 684-89.
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is groundless should be permitted in most cases to withdraw the paper
without risking sanctions. Permitting sanctions litigation at this point
simply delays adjudication of other cases in the queue.73 Unfortunately,
the Cooter & Gell Court found that a district court has jurisdiction to
sanction even when a case is voluntarily dismissed under Rule
41(a)(1)(i).74 Because the issue under Rule 11 is collateral to the merits,
the Court reasoned that a district court has continuing jurisdiction to
punish abuses.75
This analysis is unfortunate because it neglects the underlying purpose
of Rule 11-to streamline litigation. Rather than permit a litigant to
"cure" a Rule 11 violation by voluntarily dismissing an action, the Court
allows a litigant to be punished years after the voluntary dismissal of its
complaint. Resurrecting a dismissed case for the purpose of litigating the
sanctions issue is nonsensical when a federal court is backed up with
hundreds of other active cases. In addition, the Court's literal, non-pol-
icy-based opinion on the jurisdictional issue has forced lower courts to
grapple76 with the unfairness that results when a court seeks to impose
sanctions in cases of dubious "jurisdiction."77
2. What is the Appellate Standard of Review?
Before the adoption of the abuse of discretion standard in Cooter &
Gell, there was widespread disagreement among the courts of appeals
regarding the appropriate standard of review. Some courts adopted a
deferential abuse of discretion standard.7" Others used a multi-tiered ap-
proach which depended on the Rule 11 issue raised on appeal: issues of
fact would be reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, issues of
law would be reviewed de novo, and the type of sanction imposed would
be reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.79
Despite its unifying effect, the Cooter & Gell Court's abuse of discre-
tion standard of appellate review is problematic80 in light of the wide-
73. See A CriticalAnalysis, supra note 18, at 211-12.
74. See Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2457; see also A Critical Analysis, supra note 18, at
211 (discussing split in courts prior to Cooter & Gell). This issue is discussed fully in
Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, § 7.07[f], at 535-36.
75. See Cooter & Gell, 110 S. Ct. at 2457.
76. See generally Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, § 3.02[b], passim (discussing
recent cases dealing with jurisdiction to impose sanctions following dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, voluntary dismissal, dismissal under Rule 41, transfer of venue, and other
case dispositions).
77. See, e.g., Willy v. Coastal Corp., 915 F.2d 965 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that the
court had jurisdiction to impose Rule 11 sanctions even though it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the plaintiff's original claim), cert. granted, Ill S. Ct. 2824 (1991) (peti-
tion granted with respect to jurisdictional question).
78. For cases discussing the abuse of discretion standard of review, see Case Law
Perspectives, supra note 6, § 8.04[d][1], at 577-84.
79. See id. § 8.04[d][2], at 585-92.
80. For a full discussion of this issue, see Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, § 8.04,
at 594; see also id. § 2.03[c][2], at 66-70 (discussing a recent Fifth Circuit decision elabo-
rating on the abuse of discretion standard).
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spread concern that Rule 11 is not applied fairly or consistently by the
district courts. Giving the courts of appeals the opportunity to quickly
affirm denials of sanctions is one thing; giving undue deference to district
courts which have imposed sanctions is another. Neither the goal of re-
ducing the indeterminacy of Rule 11 nor the goal of fairness to those
sanctioned is served by the highly deferential type of abuse review envi-
sioned by the Court."1 Moreover, the Court's failure to develop clear
standards of conduct enhances the "crap-shoot" aspect of Rule 11, which
encourages lawyers to move for sanctions in questionable cases, in the
hopes of recovering their fees.82 Under the Cooter & Gell standard, it is
possible to be sanctioned even if there is a judge who agrees that an argu-
ment is meritorious or, at least, not frivolous. 3 This observation points
81. The Thomas approach, which adopted an abuse of discretion standard, but called
for differing levels of scrutiny depending on the result of the district court's analysis, is
preferable. See Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1988) (en
banc); Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, § 2.03[c][2], at 66-70; see also Johnson, Keel-
ing & Contois, The Least Severe Sanction Adequate" Reversing the Trend in Rule 11
Sanctions, 61 Miss. L.J. 39, 45-47 (1991) [hereinafter Reversing the Trend] (discussing the
problems of appellate court enforcement of "least severe sanction adequate" and the
abuse of discretion standard of review adopted by the courts). The Thomas court would
increase the scrutiny depending on the nature of the violation and the type or amount of
the sanction imposed, thereby providing a measure of consistency and fairness to those
sanctioned. See Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, § 8.04[d][4][A], at 595-96.
82. Proponents of Rule 11 suggest that these have been the "shakeout" years, and
that over time, the courts of appeals will develop coherent standards for applying Rule
11. See Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule 11, 130 F.LD. 479, 505-06
(1990) [hereinafter New Certification Standard]. However, a study of the cases decided
suggests that the district courts have yet to receive the guidance they need to apply the
rule fairly or uniformly.
Whether the courts of appeals are controlling the district courts is an important ques-
tion in this context. Circuit courts have affirmed district courts' awards of sanctions in
38.5% of the appeals and have affirmed their refusal to award sanctions in 30.2% of the
cases. See A Critical Analysis, supra note 18, at 202-03. Thus, they have agreed with the
district courts in 68.7% of the cases. See id That does not seem to suggest a great deal
of control. However, and not surprisingly, it is in the cases in which the court of appeals
disagrees with the district court that one finds most of the opinions with extensive exposi-
tion of the rule. The courts of appeals have reversed a sanction in 19.2% of the cases, and
have reversed the refusal to grant a sanction in 12% of the cases. See id. Thus, the
suggestion by some that there is a general trend of restraint in the courts of appeals is not
borne out by the reported cases. A signal from the Supreme Court to be more careful
when reviewing appeals from orders imposing sanctions might have resulted in a more
coherent set of guidelines as to what kind of conduct is proscribed.
83. For example, in Danese v. City of Roseville, 757 F. Supp. 827 (E.D. Mich. 1987),
rev'd sub. nom. Danese v. Asman, 875 F.2d 1239 (6th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct.
1473 (1990), the plaintiffs brought a civil rights action against city officials and employ-
ees. The district court ruled in favor of plaintiffs. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit, in a split
decision, reversed. See Danese, 875 F.2d 1239. Defendants then moved to recover actual
costs and attorney fees. The district court denied Rule 11 sanctions, stating that plain-
tiffs' conduct was within the parameters of acceptable professional conduct. As evi-
denced by plaintiffs' success in the district court and by the split decision in the Court of
Appeals, plaintiffs presented reasonable theories of recovery in their complaint based on
an adequate inquiry into relevant facts and a sufficient investigation of the relevant law.
Additionally, plaintiffs' contentions may have been warranted by a good-faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, as evidenced by the
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60
out the subjectivity problem of Rule 11 and its potential chilling effect on
the development of the law. The need for strict appellate review when
sanctions are imposed is manifest.84
C. Business Guides: Attorneys' Fees as Sanctions
Using its literal approach to Rule 11 and applying the same objective
standard to represented parties as to attorneys, the Court in Business
Guides held that Rule 11 is valid under the Rules Enabling Act." The
Court also adopted a test for determining which papers were subject to
Rule 11.86 However, the Court in this case interpreted and applied Rule
11 without considering its practical effect.
The Business Guides Court rejected the argument that imposing sanc-
tions against a represented party who acted in good faith violated the
Rules Enabling Act.8 7 Applying its "plain meaning" approach to the
interpretation of Rule 11, the Court stated that "[t]he essence of Rule 11
is that signing is no longer a meaningless act; it denotes merit. A signa-
ture sends a message to the district court that this document is to be
taken seriously."88 Accordingly, a district court may sanction a repre-
sented party for signing a paper in violation of Rule 11,89 because "[a]
contrary rule would establish a safe harbor such that sanctions could not
appellate court's split decision in favor of defendants. Danese, 757 F. Supp. at 829-30.
The court also noted that there was no evidence of bad faith or improper motive. See id.
at 830.
84. In some cases, a sanctioned litigant or attorney will ultimately succeed in revers-
ing the sanctions imposed. For example, in Alia v. Michigan Supreme Court, 906 F.2d
1100 (6th Cir. 1990), the district court dismissed the complaint and imposed sanctions.
Two judges affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. One of those judges and the dissent-
ing judge reversed the sanctions.
In other cases, the sanctioned party will not only succeed in reversing the sanctions,
but also will prevail on the law. In In re Edmonds, 924 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1991), a
creditor filed a complaint to revoke debtor's discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding. The
debtor moved to dismiss on laches and statute of limitations grounds. The bankruptcy
court granted the motion and imposed Bankruptcy Rule 9011 sanctions. The district
court affirmed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed, noting that "in its pleadings before the
bankruptcy court, creditor advanced a colorable argument why the affirmative defense of
laches and one-year statute of limitations should not bar its revocation." Id. at 181. The
Court of Appeals reinstated the complaint and reversed the sanctions.
Even issues that prove to be meritorious at the Supreme Court level are not immune
from attack. In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1407 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), the district court dismissed the complaint. The court's ruling on the sanctions
issue was ambiguous. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the dismissal was affirmed, but the
court ruled that sanctions would be improper because a good faith legal argument was
made. See Masson, 895 F.2d 1535, 1547 (9th Cir. 1989), rev'd on other grounds, 111 S.
Ct. 2419 (1991). The Supreme Court then reversed on the meritsl See Masson, Ill S. Ct.
2419.
85. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 111 S. Ct.
922, 933-34 (1991).
86. See id. at 929.
87. See id. at 934.
88. Id. at 930.
89. See id. at 930-31.
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be imposed where an attorney, pressed to act quickly, reasonably relies
on a client's careless misrepresentations."' This part of Business Guides
is troubling because the majority's opinion, while hiding behind its plain
meaning approach, expands the potential for sanctions. It goes beyond
the intent of the Advisory Committee and ignores the practical implica-
tions of its ruling: the creation of yet another Rule I I target from whom
attorneys' fees may be sought.
The Business Guides Court rejected the argument that Rule I I might
be invalid under the Rules Enabling Act because of its substantive im-
pact.91 This argument posits that Rule 11, by imposing an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness on represented parties, exceeds the limit of a
court's power by permitting fee-shifting in a manner not approved by
Congress and by creating a federal tort of malicious prosecution.9' Not-
ing that Congress does "participate[ ] in the rulemaking process," 93 the
Court found that "'rules which incidentally affect litigants' substantive
rights do not violate this provision if reasonably necessary to maintain
the integrity of that system of rules.' "9'
The duplicity here is that the Court continues to stress that attorneys'
fees are not an entitlement and that litigation should be streamlined,"
while it ignores the fact that attorneys' fees are the type of sanction most
frequently imposed. Thus, the Business Guides Court fails to grapple
with the critical issues raised by Rule 11 and keeps in place the same
incentives which have caused a proliferation of Rule 11 motions.
D. The Current State of Rule 11 Law
Pavelic & LeFlore, Cooter & Gell, and Business Guides have answered
some specific questions about Rule 11. We now know that only the at-
torney signing the paper may be sanctioned under Rule 11, that sanctions
may be imposed after a case is voluntarily dismissed, that the standard of
review is abuse of discretion, and that the primary purpose of the rule is
deterrence. Yet there are numerous problems left unresolved. For exam-
ple, although we know that district judges are given broad discretion in
imposing sanctions for frivolous litigation, we still do not know what
"frivolous" means beyond what the district court thinks it means. Nor
90. Id. at 933. The dissent argued that the Advisory Committee did not intend to
extend Rule 11 to represented parties who sign a paper. See id. at 940-41 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). Rather, it intended to make sure that pro se litigants were covered by the
amended rule. See id. at 937, 940 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Moreover, the key purpose of
the 1983 amendments to Rule 11 was to provide an effective tool for disciplining lawyers
who filed papers without adequate investigation. See id. at 935-37 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
91. See id. at 933-35.
92. See Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, § 2.03[b], at 52.
93. Business Guides, 111 S. Ct. at 933 (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Prac-
tice and Procedure § 1332, at 39-40 & n.74 (2d ed. 1990)).





do we know what a reasonably competent attorney is supposed to do to
protect a client's interests or what will happen if a lawyer guesses wrong
and is on the wrong side of a frivolous finding.
The Supreme Court cases demonstrate that the Court is committed to
ending abuses and carrying out the Advisory Committee's intent. In-
deed, the Court constantly speaks of abuses which connote bad faith.
But the Court has ignored the thrust of Rule 11, which is aimed at
merely negligent conduct, and consistently has used a literal approach to
punish behavior of parties whose conduct often borders on bad faith.
Thus, one is left with the impression that the real reason for a tough
approach to the rule is to combat the few cosmic anecdotes about
nightmare litigations. Meanwhile, lawyers are faced with practicing in
the face of this potentially awesome tool which, according to the
Supreme Court's broad language and holdings, not only subsumes truly
abusive conduct, but also applies to cases in which a party is simply on
the wrong side of the issue. "While the word 'abusive' may have some
subjective content, the word generally connotes wrongdoing. The word
'frivolous' merely connotes wrongheaded. Wrongdoing should be de-
terred. The process of winning and losing takes ample care of the
wrongheaded." 96
IV. AMENDING AMENDED RULE 11
A. The Call for Comments and the Public Hearing
In July 1990, the Advisory Committee responded to continued criti-
cisms of Rule 11 by announcing a Call for Comments about the rule and
a public hearing.97 The Call for Comments solicited responses to ten
questions, and over one hundred groups and individuals replied.9" In
addition, the Advisory Committee asked the Federal Judicial Center to
conduct empirical studies.99 In February 1991, the Advisory Committee
held a public hearing at which sixteen persons were invited to testify.t°0
The persons invited (including this author) consisted mainly of critics of
96. New York State Bar Ass'n, Report of the Special Committee to Consider Sanc-
tions for Frivolous Litigation in New York State Courts (March 20, 1990), reprinted in 18
Fordham Urb. L.J. 3, 12 (1990) [hereinafter Frivolous Litigation]. I was one of the draft-
ers of this report.
97. See Call for Written Comments, supra note 9.
98. For discussion of these questions, see infra notes 103-10 and accompanying text.
99. See Preliminary Report, supra note 37.
100. Three judges testified: Judge Mary M. Schroeder of the Ninth Circuit, Judge
Patrick Higginbotham of the Fifth Circuit, and Judge Carl Rubin from the Southern
District of Ohio. Nine members of the bar testified for various groups: Jerold S. Solovy
for the ABA Litigation Section, Francis H. Fox for the American College of Trial Law-
yers, Jeffrey Stempel for the Bar Association of the City of New York, Arthur Radke for
the Chicago Bar association, Robert Mullen for the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Right,
C. Steven Tomashefsky for the Chicago Council of Lawyers, Errol Brown for the Na-
tional Bar Association, and Michael A. Mack for the American Insurance Association. I
was also invited to testify, along with two other law professors and an attorney who have
written extensively about Rule 11: Professor Maurice Rosenberg of Columbia Law
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the rule.° 1 During the day-long public hearing, the members of the Ad-
visory Committee asked numerous questions and engaged in extensive
dialogue with those testifying regarding their responses to the ten ques-
tions posed in the Call for Comments.102
Most of the questions dealt with the issues raised in this Commentary.
Question 1 was designed to elicit views as to whether Rule 11 has
achieved its purposes of discouraging misuse of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and requiring lawyers to "stop and think" before filing
papers.10 3 Questions 2 and 3 inquired into the costs of Rule 11: whether
undue satellite litigation has developed and whether the rule causes con-
tentious behavior among counsel."° Questions 4 and 5 were designed to
answer the question of whether Rule 11 is being applied unfairly. 10  The
various surveys discussed in this Commentary indicate that the bottom
line to the first five questions is that the courts are encouraging plaintiffs
to stop and think, but are giving defendants a free ride. Moreover, the
studies suggest that the rule is not worth its costs.
Question 6 sought to answer the question of whether the courts are
fashioning the appropriate sanction upon finding a Rule 11 violation."es
My response to this question is that the judicial response to the amended
Rule's standards has been inappropriate. Indeed, the routine imposition
of attorneys' fees as a sanction has contributed to the dramatic growth of
Rule 11 activity and has disproportionately affected parties who are fi-
nancially least able to bear the brunt of huge compensatory sanctions.
Question 9 addressed the indeterminacy of the rule.00 Although Rule
li's objective standard of reasonableness was intended to be a guard
against the indeterminate use of the rule, courts have nevertheless ap-
plied this standard subjectively. The rule reads as if there is universal
agreement as to when a paper is warranted by the facts and the law or by
a good faith argument for a change in the law. Yet, this is precisely the
area where the greatest indeterminacy can be found. Reasonable minds
can often disagree as to what type of inquiry is appropriate under the
circumstances and as to whether a reasonable attorney would have fied
the paper in question. Would it have been reasonable to challenge Plessy
School, Professor Nelken of Hastings College of Law, and Gregory Joseph of New York
City.
101. In its Interim Report to the Chairman and Secretary of the Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, the Advisory Committee noted that it under-represented sup-
porters of Rule 11 by design because it "was primarily interested in ensuring that it un-
derstood the various proposals for possible revision of the rule." Interim Report, supra
note 12, at 1-4 app. 1.
102. The Committee made it clear, however, that it believed the burden was on the
critics to justify their complaints about the rule, preferably with empirical data.
103. See Call for Written Comments, supra note 9, at 345.
104. See id. at 346.
105. See id at 347.
106. See id
107. See id at 349.
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in 1920?1°8 Would it have been reasonable to challenge Roe v. Wade in
1976?1°9 This indeterminacy contributes to the rule's chilling effect, be-
cause less financially able litigants or lawyers cannot risk being
sanctioned. 110
B. The Interim Report
After considering the responses to its Call for Comments and the testi-
mony taken at the public hearing, the Advisory Committee published an
Interim Report that incorporated its findings.111 Two revealing state-
ments were made in the Summary to the Interim Report. First, the
Committee rejected the view of those who believed it was premature to
consider amending Rule 11 because more time was needed for an ade-
quate "shake-down" period. 12 Instead, it concluded that sufficient time
had passed to permit an informed assessment of the rule, and "that-
particularly in the light of the intensity of criticism-the process of possi-
ble revision should not be delayed beyond that which the procedures gov-
erning rules changes already dictate."' 1 3  Second, the Advisory
Committee stated that "the criticisms of Rule 11 have sufficient merit to
justify considering specific proposals for change."'1 a
The Interim Report also described some of the preliminary findings of
the Federal Judicial Center Study and presented the Advisory Commit-
tee's Chair's preliminary observations on the questions in the Call for
Comments. Some of the important observations were that:
1) Rule 11 should not be viewed as the primary means for control-
ling and deterring groundless litigation;
2) while the studies do not indicate substantial discontent amongjudges regarding the amount of time spent on Rule 11, there are sub-
stantial variations among courts and there is a high rate of appeal;
3) the filing of Rule 11 motions exacerbates contentious and unco-
operative behavior;
4) sanctions have been imposed more frequently against plaintiffs
108. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
110. The other questions involved subsidiary issues. Questions 7 and 8 were designed
to elicit suggestions on how to improve practice and due process under the rule. See id. at
348-49. It is clear that the Advisory Committee needs to codify procedure under Rule 11
to insure a higher degree of fairness. For example, targets of Rule 11 motions should be
given precise notice of the alleged Rule 11 violation and an opportunity to file more
meaningful responses to motions. Judges should be required to articulate precisely why
sanctions are being imposed. For a detailed discussion of various suggestions, see Case
Law Perspectives, supra note 6, § 9, passim. Question 10 addressed the relationship of
Rule 11 to various other sanctions rules and statutes. See Call for Written Comments,
supra note 9, at 350. The controversy surrounding Rule I 1 provides the Advisory Com-
mittee and perhaps Congress with an opportunity to take a comprehensive and consistent
approach to sanctions.
I 11. See Interim Report, supra note 12.
112. See id. at 1-4.
113. Id. at 1-4-5.
114. Id. at 1-5.
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and in some kinds of cases, though there is insufficient evidence that
Rule 11 is being used unfairly in civil rights cases;
5) although there is a greater impact upon certain groups, for exam-
ple, plaintiffs, there is insufficient evidence that Rule 11 is having a
"chilling effect;"
6) there is concern that monetary sanctions have become the norm
for sanctions under Rule 11;
7) questions as to timing of making and deciding Rule 11 motions
are problematic;
8) although court of appeals decisions have sufficiently clarified the
law as to proper procedures, any revision of the rule should incorpo-
rate basic standards;
9) there is substantial variation among judges in their enforcement
of the rule; and
10) although unification of sanctions rules may be desirable, crea-
tion of a single rule may not be possible because of the different kinds
of situations the different rules are designed to address.15
The Advisory Committee's receptiveness to change is welcome, and its
Interim Report fortunately has paved the way for an amended Rule 11.
C. Proposed Amendments
1. The Advisory Committee's Proposed Draft
As suggested in its Interim Report, the Advisory Committee con-
cluded that although some of the criticisms of Rule 11 were "exaggerated
or premised on faulty assumptions," widespread criticisms were "not
without some merit."' 16 It recognized that Rule 11 impacts plaintiffs
"more frequently and severely" than defendants, that it "occasionally"
creates problems for litigants seeking to assert novel legal positions or
who need discovery from an adversary, and that it is enforced too infre-
quently through nonmonetary sanctions.117 The Committee also noted
that, "with cost-shifting having become the normative sanction," the rule
contains no incentive to withdraw claims that become insupportable and
sometimes creates attorney-client conflicts and "exacerbate[s] conten-
tious behavior between counsel." 1 8
Despite these findings, the Advisory Committee rejected the idea of
returning Rule 11 to its pre-1983 bad faith standard. 119 Rather, it has
115. Id. at 1-10-25.
116. Letter from Judge Sam C. Pointer to Hon. Robert E. Keeton, June 13, 1991 (re-
vised), reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 63 (1991).
117. Id at 64-65.
118. Id.
119. The Committee stated:
The revision is designed to increase the fairness and effectiveness of the rule as a
means to deter presentation and maintenance of frivolous positions, while at the
same time actually reducing the frequency of Rule 11 motions. It does not
adopt the suggestions made by many that sanctions be imposed only for willful
violations, or be made permissive rather than mandatory. Such changes would
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proposed several major changes to Rule 11. These changes can be seen
in its suggested revision of the fifth sentence of Rule 11:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting or maintaining a claim,
defense, request, demand, objection, contention, or argument in a
pleading, written motion, or other paper filed with or submitted to the
court, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying, until it is with-
drawn, that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and
belief formed after inquiry reasonable under the circumstances-
(1) it is not being presented or maintained for any improper pur-
pose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless in-
crease in the cost of litigation;
(2) it is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establish-
ment of new law; and
(3) any allegations or denials of facts have evidentiary support or, if
specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.1 20
There are four major revisions to the rule. The Advisory Committee
first suggests that signatures no longer serve as the triggering event to a
Rule 11 motion. Instead, the operative event should be the "presenting
or maintaining" of a representation to the court. This suggestion elimi-
nates the "snap-shot" rule-pursuant to which a paper could be judged
under Rule 11 only as of the time the paper was signed-and signifi-
cantly broadens the scope of the rule. Under the snap-shot rule, a court
cannot sanction an attorney who makes a reasonable inquiry as of the
time a paper was filed, but who refuses to withdraw the paper when sub-
sequent discovery or research shows the position taken is untenable. The
new language codifies the "continuing duty" concept, whereby a party
may be sanctioned if the paper or position becomes insupportable. 1 2
This broadening of the rule, however, is unnecessary. In its present
form, it is already relatively easy to retrigger Rule 11. If discovery or
further research discloses that a position is insupportable, and an adver-
sary refuses to withdraw it, Rule 11 is retriggered whenever the adver-
sary files baseless papers in opposition to a dispositive motion.
Although it changes the language of the rule slightly, the Proposed
Draft retains the "reasonable inquiry" requirement. Thus, the Advisory
be inappropriate in view of the modifications in the wording of the obligations-
in effect permitting a party, if candid in its papers, to advance innovative theo-
ries of law and to make allegations based on information and belief-and in
view of the provisions affording a "safe harbor" from Rule 11 motions through
the opportunity, after notice, to withdraw voluntarily from insupportable posi-
tions. In light of these changes, violations of the rule would rarely involve con-
duct that is not either willful or deceptive, and hence some form of sanctions
should be imposed.
Id. at 65.
120. Proposed Draft, supra note 13, at 2-3.
121. For a discussion of the snap-shot rule and the continuing duty, see Case Law
Perspectives, supra note 6, § 5.04, at 335-50.
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Committee rejects the suggestion of some commentators that it would be
preferable to delete the reasonable inquiry requirement and to require
instead that only nonfrivolous papers be filed. Some critics of the "con-
duct" approach argue that it intrudes on the attorney-client relationship
and that it wastes judicial resources to inquire into what an attorney did
pre-filing even when the claim fied is colorable.' 22 However, many
judges and lawyers praise the requirement that attorneys stop and think
before filing, because it has been effective in deterring some baseless fil-
ings. 1 23 There is little reason to abandon the one aspect of the rule which
has been somewhat successful. However, this portion of the rule should
be clarified to prevent courts from inquiring into what an attorney did in
the pre-filing stage unless the paper is groundless.
"Although continuing to require litigants to 'stop and think' before
initially making legal or factual contentions,"' 124 the Advisory Commit-
tee's proposed revision "places equal emphasis on the duty of candor"2'
and on the obligation to withdraw from positions when they are no
longer tenable."' 126 There are two problems, however, with incorporating
the duty of candor into Rule 11. First, permitting sanctions to be im-
posed based on how an argument is made unnecessarily extends the
rule.'2 7 Second, other sanction devices exist to punish the offender 2 ' if
the argument identification, miscitation, or misrepresentation of fact is
willful.
The second major revision attempts to respond to the unequal burden
Rule 11 places on plaintiffs. Recognizing that sometimes a litigant has
good reason to believe, without yet knowing, that a fact is true or false,
the Proposed Draft also substantially changes the language of the certifi-
cation with respect to facts.' 2 9 Rather than state that the paper is war-
ranted by the facts, the Committee's proposal requires that a party's
"allegations or denials of facts have evidentiary support," or, if specifi-
cally so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support.' 30 To insure
that this language will be understood as softening the rule, the Advisory
Committee notes that the standard is not whether a party has sufficient
122. See New York State Bar Ass'n, Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 13-14, 16-17 (Nov. 1990).
123. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
124. Proposed Draft, supra note 13, at 5 (Advisory Committee Note).
125. There are two aspects of the duty of candor: argument identification and failure
to cite. For a discussion of cases addressing the duty of candor, see Case Law Perspec-
tives, supra note 6, § 5.03[c][1][A], at 315-17 and § 6.04[d], at 440-57.
126. Proposed Draft, supra note 13, at 5 (Advisory Committee Note).
127. See Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540-41 (9th
Cir. 1986).
128. For example, a court can employ 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or use its inherent power to
punish parties who litigate in bad faith. See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123,
2135 (1991).
129. For a discussion of this problem, see Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6,
§ 4.01[b], at 193 and § 6.03[f], at 405-07.
130. Proposed Draft, supra note 13, at 3.
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facts to prevail, but instead whether there is or there is likely to be sup-
port.13 ' The concept behind this change to Rule 1 1 is a positive one,
because it is a more forgiving standard when a litigant is not in posses-
sion of relevant facts. However, its implementation may be problematic.
If the amended rule is used like the 1983 version, a change of language
such as this probably will cause an increase in Rule 11 litigation, because
parties will dispute whether discovery is likely to result in the facts al-
leged and whether the pleader properly identified which facts were sup-
portable and which needed discovery.
The third, and perhaps most important, suggestion of the Proposed
Draft is procedural: it insures that notice will be given to targets, clari-
fies the procedure for making Rule 11 motions, and provides a safe har-
bor for targeted parties. This change would require parties to raise Rule
11 issues in a separate motion and to describe the "specific conduct that
appears to violate" the rule.132 In addition, it would prevent parties from
filing or presenting Rule 11 motions to the court "unless the challenged
claim, defense, request, demand, objection, contention, or argument is
not withdrawn or corrected within 21 days (or such other time as the
court may prescribe) after service of the motion."' 133 The purpose of this
proposed revision is to make it possible for a litigant to withdraw a claim
that it knows is insupportable without having to risk Rule 11 sanctions.
It also is intended to reduce the current practice of making threats or
sending vague "Rule 11 letters" to bully an opponent into withdrawing a
paper or position.
The Advisory Committee's Proposed Draft also provides a safe harbor
by prohibiting a court from imposing monetary sanctions sua sponte un-
less an order has been issued that both specifically describes the conduct
that violates the rule and requires the party to show cause why it should
not be sanctioned for violating the rule. The safe harbor provisions are
the most important additions to the rule. A litigant who has made a
mistake should have the opportunity to withdraw a paper without suffer-
ing sanctions.
Unfortunately, the Proposed Draft's rejection of the "paper-as-a-
whole" approach undermines the benefits of the safe harbor provisions.
The proposed amendments shift the focus from the paper-as-a-whole to
each aspect of a paper (i.e., a party violates Rule 11 by "presenting or
maintaining a claim, defense, request, demand, objection, contention, or
argument"). 134 As a result, repeated Rule 11 motions can be served at-
tacking different or insignificant aspects of a paper.3 5 This, unfortu-
131. See id. at 6.
132. Id. at 4.
133. Id. at 3.
134. Id. at 2.
135. The Advisory Committee makes clear in its note that each aspect of a paper
should be analyzed, and that the sanctions imposed should flow directly from that analy-
sis. Thus, the "paper-as-a-whole" approach, by which a litigant who filed a paper con-
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nately, may cause more confusion and collateral litigation.,3 6
If a motion is filed and is successful, the Proposed Draft resolves the
problem of what a Rule 11 order should consist of by requiring the dis-
trict court, on request, to "recite the conduct or circumstances deter-
mined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed."' 137 It also continues to permit sanctions to be im-
posed on a motion if a case is settled or voluntarily dismissed. However,
the twenty-one day waiting period designed to provide targets with an
opportunity to settle or voluntarily withdraw should reduce the kind of
"sandbagging" that the Supreme Court permitted in Cooter & Gell. 3 1
Under the Proposed Draft, a potential Rule 11 target need not worry
about sanctions if it withdraws a paper or its position before a motion is
made, because presumably a Rule 11 motion cannot be served unless
there is some paper, claim, or contention that can be withdrawn within
the twenty-one-day period. Similarly, when a court seeks to impose
sanctions sua sponte under the proposed revision, monetary sanctions
may not be imposed unless the order to show cause was issued before
settlement or voluntary dismissal. Thus, a party will not have to worry
about post-dismissal sanctions from its adversary or from the court.
In an effort to deemphasize cost-shifting, the fourth major revision of
the Proposed Draft is its codification of the "least severe sanction" rule:
"A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is
sufficient to deter comparable conduct by persons similarly situated."' 39
Instead of isolating attorneys' fees as a type of permissible sanction, the
Proposed Draft mentions "directives of a nonmonetary nature."' °
Although it allows monetary sanctions, it makes clear that attorneys' fees
may be awarded only when sanctions are imposed on motion. It also
provides that partial fees may be awarded and that only fees and "costs
incurred as a direct result of the violation" may be awarded.''
The Proposed Draft also allows a court to impose "an appropriate
sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties determined, after notice
and a reasonable opportunity to respond, to be responsible for a violation
of [the rule]."' 4 2 This language holds non-signers sanctionable, thereby
taining baseless as well as colorable claims would not be sanctioned if the "paper-as-a-
whole" was colorable, has been abandoned. Id. at 5.
136. See Case Law Perspectives, supra note 6, § 5.04[a], at 336-39.
137. Proposed Draft, supra note 13, at 4.
138. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1991). For a discussion of
this case, see supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text.
139. Proposed Draft, supra note 13, at 4.
140. Id.
141. Id. The Advisory Committee Note picks up on the language by explaining that
there is a duty of mitigation, by setting forth a range of nonmonetary sanctions, and by
detailing the factors a court should consider in determining what sanction should be im-
posed. See id. at 6-7 (Advisory Committee Note).
142. Id. at 3.
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superceding the Court's decision in Pavelic & LeFlore. 43 Unfortunately,
this suggested change may result in more protracted Rule 11 proceedings
in many cases, as courts will be required to determine relative
culpability. 1"
2. The Bench-Bar Proposal
Prominent federal judges and lawyers have put forth a counter-propo-
sal to address three critical problems in the Advisory Committee's Pro-
posed Draft.14 The Bench-Bar Proposal's proponents claim that the
Advisory Committee's Proposed Draft has the potential for engendering
a Rule 11 controversy over every claim, defense, argument, or contention
made in a case. They also argue that the requirement that a position be
abandoned may turn a lawsuit "not into a prospective search for the
truth but into a retroactive exercise in perfected pleadings."' 46 Third,
they contend that the bar will use the new safe harbor provision
counterproductively:
The business of (a) endless amplification of the grounds for sanctions;
and (b) endless correspondence of the "you did it" and "no I didn't"
variety adds enormously to the cost of litigation .... From the stand-
point of one of the unhappiest aspects of Rule 11, the decrease of civil-
ity within the profession, the proposal accentuates the deterioration of
professional relations. 147
The Bench-Bar Proposal strips down the language of the Advisory
Committee's proposal. Paragraph (1) simply requires papers to be signed
and is essentially the same as paragraph (a) of the Advisory Committee
proposal. 148 Paragraph (2) rejects the new certification language of the
Advisory Committee's proposal, instead advocating certification lan-
guage similar to that in the 1983 version of the rule. This paragraph
states that the signature constitutes a certificate that the paper has been
read and that "to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, the paper taken as a whole is well
grounded in fact and law, including non-frivolous arguments for possible
change of law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose." 14 9
143. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 110 S. Ct 456, 458-59 (1989);
see supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
144. Under proposed subsection (c)(2)(A), monetary sanctions may not be awarded
against a represented party unless it caused the presentation or maintenance of a position
for an improper purpose. See Proposed Draft, supra note 13, at 4. To the extent that the
Advisory Committee was concerned about attorney-client relations, the proposal will do
little. An attorney who seeks to avoid sanctions may still want to defend by pointing out
that the client wanted a paper filed for some improper purpose, such as to delay the
proceedings.
145. Bench-Bar Proposal, supra note 14.
146. Id. at 1.
147. Id. at 2.
148. See id. at 4.




Bench-Bar proponents thus seek to avoid litigation over each conten-
tion in a paper. Such litigation, they argue, would distract the parties
from the merits of the case. The words "taken as a whole" were added to
require the court to assess the paper as a whole. The Bench-Bar Proposal
also simplifies the meaning of the certification with respect to the law.
The phrase "including non-frivolous arguments for possible change of
law" is intended to avoid codifying the duty of candor and to provide a
lenient standard to avoid the chilling problem.' 50
Paragraph (3) of the Bench-Bar Proposal provides for sanctions on
motion or sua sponte, but with an important difference from the Pro-
posed Draft. It states that a court may impose sanctions if a Rule 11
violation is found, rather than shall impose a sanction.' This modifica-
tion gives judges discretion to refuse to impose sanctions in appropriate
cases, such as when there has been a minor or technical Rule 11
violation.
Like the Proposed Draft, the Bench-Bar Proposal would permit sanc-
tions to be imposed against a law firm. However, it would not permit
sanctions to be imposed against represented parties unless they were re-
sponsible for a filing for an improper purpose. Thus, it limits the sanc-
tion to what would be sufficient to deter comparable conduct by persons
similarly situated.
The Bench-Bar Proposal prohibits sanctions in the nature of attorneys'
fees. Instead, it proposes that all monetary sanctions be paid to the
court. The elimination of attorneys' fees is justifiable as a means of elimi-
nating the use of Rule 11 as a fee-shifting device. It is unfortunate, how-
ever, that the proposal does not retain the availability of nonmonetary
sanctions such as reprimands.
The Bench-Bar Proposal states in paragraph (4) that "[n]o sanction
shall issue until the attorney or party who may be sanctioned has been
given notice based upon a precisely stated alleged violation of the rule
and has had the opportunity to be heard either orally or in writing."'' 15
The proposal should be clarified to provide an explicit a safe harbor. For
example, it could provide that "no sanction shall issue if the attorney or
party promptly withdraws the paper after such notice has been given."
Finally, the proposal requires "written findings of fact and conclusions
of law" whenever sanctions are imposed.' 53 These procedural protec-
tions are comparable to those proposed by the Advisory Committee.
V. CONCLUSION
The Bench-Bar Proposal characterizes the Advisory Committee's Pro-
150. Id.
151. See id. at 4.
152. Id. at 5.
153. Id. These findings "shall consider the duty violated; the actual injury caused; and
the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances." Id.
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posed Draft as "mak[ing] a very bad matter much worse than it was
before." '54 Clearly, the Advisory Committee's approach was to add new
language and procedures in an attempt to make the rule more precise and
controllable. While the safe harbor idea is an excellent one, one wonders
whether it will have its desired effect. There is a danger that the more
expansive innovations will predominate, creating more satellite litigation
without solving the real problems identified by the Advisory Committee.
On the other hand, the Bench-Bar Proposal does not yet have as exten-
sive an explanatory note as the Advisory Committee, and thus does not
provide a great deal of information as to how the rule ought to be inter-
preted and applied.' 55 Given its similarity to the current Rule 11 lan-
guage, there is a potential for judges and lawyers who have employed
Rule 11 abusively to continue that behavior. In addition, there is no
explicit safe harbor in the Bench-Bar Proposal, and there is no provision
for imposing nonmonetary sanctions. Yet, given the last eight years' ex-
perience, the Bench-Bar Proposal has greater potential for eliminating
the harmful effects of Rule 11 because it is simpler and does not intro-
duce new language that the bar is likely to dispute.
Both proposals are aimed at egregious conduct. Thus, the framers of
both proposals believe that the abusive, not merely the wrong-headed,
should be the targets of Rule 11. The Advisory Committee's Proposed
Draft contains a number of important procedures for weeding out im-
proper Rule 11 activity. Yet, its emphasis on each allegation and posi-
tion taken will necessarily invite more Rule 11 activity and detract from
the merits of the litigation.
Because it provides for discretionary sanctions and precludes the im-
position of attorneys' fees as a sanction, the Bench-Bar Proposal will in-
sure that Rule 11 motions will be made almost exclusively in egregious
cases because it eliminates the fee-shifting incentive. If a party believes
that the party opposing it has filed a baseless paper, it will still be in that
party's interest to seek to have the adversary voluntarily withdraw the
paper in order to keep legal fees and costs to a minimum. Thus, remov-
ing the opportunity to receive an attorneys' fee award may be the best
safe harbor available and may eliminate satellite litigation. Because the
goal of Rule 11 is to streamline litigation, therefore, the Bench-Bar Pro-
posal provides the best ammunition for attacking and eliminating abusive
trial practices.
154. Id. at 1.
155. For example, an explanatory note might state that ordinarily, sanctions should
not be imposed when a party has voluntarily discontinued an action, or if the case has
been settled.
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